Abstract
Introduction
Existing intrusion detection systems rely heavily on human analysts to differentiate intrusive from non-intrusive network traffic. The large and growing amount of data confronts the analysts with an overwhelming task, making the automation of aspects of this task necessary. Whether complete automation is possible or even desirable is debatable.
We describe the use of machine learning techniques which provide decision aids for the analysts and which automatically generate rules to be used for computer network intrusion detection.
The Applied Research Laboratories of the University of
Texas at Austin (ARL:UT) has developed significant expertise in the area of machine learning through internal research and development. This research has been applied to a number of applications in which machine learning techniques, such as generation of finite state machines and pattern matching, have been used [5] [6] . The Network Exploitation Detection Analyst Assistant (NEDAA) is one such application, combining artificial intelligence rule generation with a classic expert system as an enhancement for intrusion detection systems (IDS). 1 In this paper we give an overview of machine learning techniques used and we describe some of the successes and problems encountered in applying these techniques to computer network intrusion detection.
Our application layers machine learning techniques onto an existing network-based IDS deployed to protect military subnetworks. On each military subnetwork there is a probe that filters and logs network traffic to a central database [8] .
A rule set is used to analyze archived data for intrusive patterns. The pattern matching has traditionally been simple, looking for exploitive activity such as connections from certain IP addresses with histories of intrusive behavior. However, an intrusion into a computer network can be more complex, with the complexity being both spatial and temporal. An example of this type of intrusion is a 'low and slow' attack consisting of intrusive behavior over hours, days or weeks that may originate from multiple network sources.
Machine learning can be applied to this problem to extend human pattern recognition. Automated techniques are ideal for this application because they can monitor and correlate vast numbers of intrusive signatures.
Machine Learning Techniques
Our current implementation of NEDAA contains rule generation modules that interface with two ARL:UT artificial intelligence (AI) software packages: a genetic algorithm tool set and a decision tree generator. These modules can be customized for specific applications and data sources. The choice of AI techniques employed stemmed from our previous experience with genetic algorithms, and literature research into other applicable methods. The genetic algorithm software package was a logical platform from which to tackle the difficult problem of intrusion detection. The use of decision trees for rule generation was made to provide a deterministic alternative to genetic algorithms.
VulcanRG, the machine learning component of the NEDAA system, generates rules for compilation into intrusion detection systems. These rules are generated by the genetic algorithm and by decision tree packages developed at ARL:UT. We currently use VulcanRG to generate rules for one deployed IDS and one experimental system. Many of the examples presented in this paper are derived from actual runs of the machine learning components of NEDAA.
Genetic Algorithms
Genetic algorithms are a family of problem-solving techniques based on evolution and natural selection. They are essentially a type of search algorithm, and as such, can be used to solve a wide variety of problems. This section gives a brief overview of genetic algorithms.
The goal of genetic algorithms is to create optimal solutions to problems. Potential solutions to the problem to 
Decision Trees
Decision trees are structures used to classify data with common attributes. Each decision tree represents a rule which categorizes data according to these attributes. A decision tree consists of nodes, leaves, and edges. A node of a decision tree specifies an attribute by which the data is to be partitioned. Each node has a number of edges which are labeled according to a possible value of the attribute in the parent node. An edge connects either two nodes or a node and a leaf. Leaves are labeled with a decision value for categorization of the data. Table 1 In this example IP Port, and System Name label the nodes, intrusion and normal label the leaves, and the labeled arrows are the edges. The generated decision tree is shown in Figure 1 . We use Quinlan's [7] ID3 algorithm to construct decision trees from structured data (such as the data in Table 1 ). The ID3 algorithm uses information theoretic precepts to create efficient decision trees. Given a structured data set, a list of attributes describing each data element, and a set of categories to partition the data into, the ID3 algorithm determines which attribute most accurately categorizes the data. A node is established and labeled by this attribute. 
Example 1 A decision tree to detect intrusive behavior based on the data in

Machine Learning applied to Intrusion Detection
The NEDAA machine learning approach uses analystcreated training sets for rule development and analyst decision support. In the current implementation the training information is comprised of database views queried from the archived network events (Table 3) . From this training data, the machine learning modules generate rules of the form:
if < condition > then < action > These rules can be compiled into the expert system for intrusive event detection, or used to simplify the analyst's task by summarizing large sets of training data into simple rule sets. It is important to note that the quality of the synthesized rules depends on the quality of the training set.
Any classification errors in the training set will propagate into the resulting rule set. 
Applying Genetic Algorithms
In the current version of NEDAA, we use genetic algorithms to evolve simple rules for monitoring network traffic. Table 3 is shown in Figure 3 . 3 When a rule is used to filter connections, each connection is converted to a 29-field format corresponding to the gene structure of a rule as described above. A rule matches a connection if and only if every non-wildcard gene in the rule matches the corresponding field in the connection. The classic genetic algorithm described earlier tends to converge on a single 'best' solution to any given problem.
In the case of a rule set, however, it is generally not sufficient to find a single rule. Multiple rules are generally needed to identify unrelated types of anomalies; several 'good' rules are more effective than a single 'best' one. In mathematical terms, this requirement translates to the concept of finding local maxima as opposed to the global maximum of the fitness function. Genetic algorithms evolve solutions which maximize (or minimize) the fitness function.
A traditional genetic algorithm will attempt to find a global maximum of the fitness function, and will continue until all solutions in the population have converged to this maximum. In contrast, the problem of discovering multiple rules to filter incoming connections based on different criteria is essentially that of discovering multiple local maxima of the fitness function.
In order to find local maxima of the fitness function, and hence multiple rules, we employed niching techniques.
Conceptually, niching in genetic algorithms is similar to that in nature; different species that share an environment generally inhabit different niches in order to exploit resources and minimize competition. In genetic algorithms, niching strategies attempt to create subpopulations which converge on local maxima. The two standard ways of niching are sharing and crowding [4] . Sharing degrades the fitness of solutions based on the number of other solutions which are nearby (similar). When the fitness is degraded in this manner, overcrowded niches become less hospitable, forcing solutions to other local maxima which may be less populated. In crowding, solutions which are generated by the crossover of two 'parent' solutions replace the nearest (most similar) solutions in the population.
Both sharing and crowding use the concept of nearness, or similarity, in order to maintain population diversity. A distance metric must be imposed either on the space of solutions or on the space of chromosomes in order to use either of these niching methods. Unless a domain specific distance metric is determined for the problem, the Hamming distance is used [4] . The Hamming distance between two chromosomes is the number of genes which differ between the two chromosomes. We use the Hamming distance and a variation of crowding in order to generate a diverse rule set.
Applying Decision Trees
We use the ID3 algorithm to create decision trees which classify connections based on the attributes listed in Table 3 .
The generated decision tree can be pruned to determine connections which have similar attributes to those in Table 3 . In this way decision trees generalize information learned during their construction. A pruned decision tree generated by the ID3 algorithm based on data in Table 3 is shown in Figure 4. 
Future Plans
The goal of machine learning as applied to network intrusion detection is to generate a minimal rule set which can detect intrusion signatures generalized from previous activity. We want a minimal number of rules for rapid response and efficiency in the expert system. Rule complexity must mirror complexity of attacks; as hackers become more skilled our AI techniques need to create correspondingly complex rules. Our primary near-term goal is to extend the machine learning components to correlate and filter sets of connections as opposed to single connections.
We will combine connection filtering with other information the IDS records (events, strings matched etc.) to create complex rules based on data annotated by analysts. More complex rules will look for connection patterns which are extensive in both space and time. Ideally these rules will be able to detect the 'low and slow' attack.
There are many ways to build rules that are based on a number of connections, events, etc. One way is to create rules which can cause other rules to be activated. This method, known as rule chaining, allows complex sequences of events to be detected [3] . Given a number of rules of the form fif < predicate > then < action >g, the execution of one rule's action during a cycle may trigger the successful evaluation of another rule's predicate on subsequent cycles. Enhancements to the current decision tree module would be useful for extending their current utility. Decision trees work best for attributes with a small number of values.
Planned enhancements would allow for the use of manyvalued attributes [1] . The ID3 algorithm builds decision trees from an annotated data set. If the data set is augmented, a new decision tree must be built to encompass the changes. Building a decision tree is computationally intensive. In order to avoid this computation new algorithms have been developed to update existing decision trees based on new information [2] . This allows us to build scalable decision trees, and thus continually refine the rule set as new information becomes known to the analyst. We will investigate scalable decision tree construction as an enhancement to our current system.
We are also looking to employ the decision tree module to identify anomalous sequences of network events. Decision trees can be used to cluster network events into similar categories based on common attributes. Intrusive sequences of network events would be associated with sequences of corresponding clusters. By labeling these sequences as intrusive, we can generalize the specific intrusion sequences to encompass similar sequences.
The decision tree module currently generates decision trees by maximizing the information gain ratio at each level of the tree. This produces a decision tree which attempts to accurately differentiate network events based on their common attributes. By replacing the information gain ratio with a distance function on the set of training data, the resulting decision tree would partition the training set into subsets defined by similarity. By using a distance function with a scalable decision tree builder, one could create a decision tree which clusters the set of archived network events. This decision tree would contain almost all of the information of the archived data, but in a more manageable and compact format.
This decision tree snapshot of the archived network traffic could be used to create rules which chain to detect complex intrusions. Each network event would fall into a unique partition determined by the decision tree. Sequences of network events would be mapped to sequences of corresponding partitions. Since all elements in a given partition are similar, a sequence of partitions could represent a number of related (but distinct) sequences of network events. By building rules based on sequences of partitions generated by known intrusion signatures, rules could be built which detect those intrusions, and other similar sequences of network events.
The decision trees built to cluster data have additional value beyond rule generation for intrusion detection. These decision trees represent snapshots of the archived data, which can be used when lightweight approximations of the archived data are necessary.
In addition to enhancing our current suite of machine learning techniques, we also intend to research other artificial intelligence methods applicable to intrusion detection.
Methods such as neural nets, and statistical methods may have utility in expanding our capabilities. The complexity of attacks that we can detect will improve as our machine learning techniques improve.
Conclusion
We have adapted existing machine learning applications to develop rules for a deployed IDS. The rule generation component of NEDAA is layered onto an expert system that enhances the ability of the IDS to filter anomalous connections. The current machine learning approach uses genetic algorithms and decision trees. The rules we have developed and deployed differentiate anomalous connections from normal network connections. Planned near-term improvements will allow for more complex rule development.
Created rule sets are to be evaluated against known data sets such as training data from the DARPA Intrusion Detection
Evaluation. Preliminary analysis of the DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data using our machine learning components has yielded patterns in the data set attributed to the contrived nature of the training data.
The main result of the presented material is the production of rules for compilation into the expert system. We are pursuing the creation of rules to detect complex network intrusions to maximize the utility of the expert system, and to produce a dynamic rule base capable of detecting new attack signatures.
